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THE Σ1-DEFINABLE UNIVERSAL FINITE SEQUENCE
JOEL DAVID HAMKINS AND KAMERYN J. WILLIAMS
Abstract. We introduce the Σ1-definable universal finite sequence and prove
that it exhibits the universal extension property amongst the countable models
of set theory under end-extension. That is, (i) the sequence is Σ1-definable and
provably finite; (ii) the sequence is empty in transitive models; and (iii) if M
is a countable model of set theory in which the sequence is s and t is any finite
extension of s in this model, then there is an end extension of M to a model in
which the sequence is t. Our proof method grows out of a new infinitary-logic-
free proof of the Barwise extension theorem, by which any countable model of
set theory is end-extended to a model of V = L or indeed any theory true in a
suitable submodel of the original model. The main theorem settles the modal
logic of end-extensional potentialism, showing that the potentialist validities
of the models of set theory under end-extensions are exactly the assertions
of S4. Finally, we introduce the end-extensional maximality principle, which
asserts that every possibly necessary sentence is already true, and show that
every countable model extends to a model satisfying it.
1. Introduction
We provide a Σ1 definition in set theory of a finite sequence and prove that it
exhibits a universal extension property amongst the countable models of set theory.
Main Theorem. For any computably axiomatizable theory ZF extending ZF, there
is a Σ1-definable finite sequence
a0, a1, . . . , an
with the following properties:
(1) ZF proves that the sequence is finite.
(2) In any transitive model M of ZF, the sequence is empty.
(3) If M is a countable model of ZF in which the sequence is s and t ∈ M is
any finite sequence (in the sense of M) extending s, then there is a covering
end-extension of M to a model N |= ZF in which the sequence is exactly t,
and in which every set of M is countable.
(4) Indeed, for statements (2) and (3), it suffices merely that M |= ZF and
end-extends a submodel W |= ZF of height at least (ωL1 )
M .
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This theorem is a sister to the universal finite set of Hamkins andWoodin [HW17],
which provided a Σ2-definable finite set having a universal extension property with
respect to the models of set theory under rank-extensions (also known as top-
extensions), namely, those for which the new sets of the extension all have higher
rank than the old sets; thus, the smaller model is determined by a cut in the Vα-
hierarchy of the larger model. The Hamkins–Woodin universal set naturally used
a Σ2 definition, as it is precisely the Σ2 assertions that are witnessed in the rank
initial segments Vα of the universe.
In the main result of this article, in contrast, we seek universality with respect
to arbitrary end-extensions of models of set theory, and since it is precisely the
Σ1 assertions that are witnessed in ∈-initial segments of the universe, we seek
accordingly a Σ1-definable universal sequence. In short, we seek to undertake a Σ1
analogue of the Σ2 analysis of [HW17], working with end-extensions of models of
set theory rather than rank extensions.
Both the Σ1-definable universal finite sequence of this article and the Σ2-definable
universal finite set of [HW17] should be seen as set-theoretic analogues of Woodin’s
universal algorithm, a Turing machine program that provably enumerates a finite
sequence of numbers exhibiting a universal extension property with respect to the
models of arithmetic under end extensions [Woo11; Ham18b; BE17; Bla17].
To clarify terms, an end-extension of a model of set theory
〈
M,∈M
〉
is another
model
〈
N,∈N
〉
, such that the first is a ∈-initial substructure of the second. That is,
M ⊆ N and ∈M = ∈N ↾M , but further, the new model does not add new elements
to old sets; more precisely: if a ∈N b ∈M , then a ∈M and hence a ∈M b. Such an
end-extension is a covering end-extension if the larger model has a covering set, an
object m ∈ N such that a ∈N m for all a ∈M .
Set theory, of course, overflows with instances of end-extensions and covering
end-extensions. The rank-initial segments Vα end-extend to their higher instances
Vβ , which also cover them, when α < β; similarly, the hierarchy of the constructible
universe Lα ⊆ Lβ are covering end-extensions; every transitive set end-extends to all
its supersets. The set-theoretic universe V is an end-extension of the constructible
universe L and every forcing extensionM [G] is an end-extension of its ground model
M , though neither of these extensions are covering. In particular, one should not
confuse end-extensions with rank-extensions, where all the new sets come in only at
higher ranks. Observe, however, that every Σ2-elementary end-extension is a rank-
extension and that every rank-extension modeling ZF is a covering end-extension.
In the proof of the main theorem, we shall make key use of the fact that every
countable model of set theory has an elementary end-extension.
Theorem 1 (Keisler–Morley [KM68]). Every countable model of ZF has an ele-
mentary end-extension.
For models of ZFC, this can be proved by means of a suitable definable ultra-
power, in the language of set theory augmented with a generic well-order. The
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general ZF case can be proved using the omitting types theorem in order to ensure
the end-extension property. The result is known not to generalize to uncountable
models of set theory. For example, if κ is the least inaccessible cardinal, then 〈Vκ,∈〉
has no elementary end-extension.
2. A new proof of the Barwise extension theorem
Our proof of the main theorem grows out of ideas in a certain new proof of the
classical Barwise extension theorem, which we shall provide in this section as a
warm-up to the main theorem.
Theorem 2 (Barwise extension theorem [Bar71]). Every countable model of ZF
has an end-extension to a model of ZFC+ V = L.
The Barwise extension theorem is simultaneously (i) a technical culmination of
the pioneering methods of Barwise in admissible set theory and infinitary logic,
including the Barwise compactness and completeness theorems and the admissible
cover, but also (ii) one of those rare mathematical theorems that is saturated with
significance for the philosophy of mathematics and particularly the philosophy of set
theory. The first author discussed these philosophical aspects at length in [Ham14].
The new development here regarding this theorem is a new direct proof due to
Hamkins, with the interesting feature—downright surprising in light of (i) above—
that it makes no use of Barwise compactness and indeed no use of infinitary logic at
all. Instead, the proof uses only classical methods of descriptive set theory, namely,
the representation of Π11 sets with well-founded trees, the Le´vy and Shoenfield
absoluteness theorems, the reflection theorem, and the Keisler–Morley theorem on
elementary end-extensions of countable models of set theory.
Proof (Hamkins [Ham18a]). Suppose that M is a countable model of ZF set the-
ory. Consider first the easier case, where M is ω-nonstandard. For any standard
natural number k, the reflection theorem ensures that there are arbitrarily high
LMα satisfying the finite theory fragment ZFCk, and so every countable transitive
set m ∈ LM has an end-extension to a model of ZFCk +V = L. By overspill, there
must be some nonstandard k for which LM thinks that every countable transitive
set m has an end-extension to a countable model of ZFCk + V = L. This is a
Π12 statement about k, which will therefore also be true in M , by the Shoenfield
absoluteness theorem. By the Keisler–Morley theorem, M has an elementary end-
extension M+. Let θ be a new ordinal on top of M , and let M+[G] be a forcing
extension in which m = VM
+
θ becomes countable. Since the Π
1
2 statement transfers
to M+ and then to M+[G], there is in M+[G] an end-extension of 〈m,∈M
+
〉 to a
model 〈N,∈N 〉 thatM+[G] thinks satisfies ZFCk+V = L. Since k is nonstandard,
this theory includes all of the actual ZFC axioms, and since m end-extends M , we
have found an end-extension of M to a model of ZFC + V = L, as desired.
Consider now the harder case, whereM is ω-standard. LetM+ be an elementary
end-extension of M , and consider m = VM
+
θ , where θ is a new ordinal above M .
If 〈m,∈M
+
〉 has an end-extension to a model of ZFC + V = L, then we’re done,
since such a model would also end-extendM . So assume toward contradiction that
there is no such end-extension of m. Let M+[G] be a forcing extension in which
m has become countable. The assertion that m has no end-extension to a model
of ZFC + V = L is actually true and hence true in M+[G]. This is a Π11 assertion
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there about the real coding m. Every such assertion has a canonically associated
tree, which is well-founded exactly when the statement is true. Since the statement
is true in M+[G], this tree has some countable rank λ there. Since these models
have the standard ω, the tree associated with the statement is the same for us as
inside the model, and since the statement is actually true, the tree is actually well
founded. So the rank λ comes from the well-founded part of the model.
If λ happens to be countable in LM
+
, then consider the assertion, “there is a
countable transitive set, such that the assertion that it has no end-extension to a
model of ZFC + V = L has rank λ.” This is a Σ1 assertion, since it is witnessed
by the countable transitive set and the ranking function of the tree associated with
the non-extension assertion. Since the parameters are countable, it follows by Le´vy
reflection that the statement is true in LM
+
. So LM
+
has a countable transitive
set, such that the assertion that it has no end-extension to a model of ZFC+V = L
has rank λ. But since λ is actually well-founded, the statement would have to be
actually true; but it isn’t, since LM
+
itself is such an extension, a contradiction.
So we may assume λ is uncountable in LM
+
. In this case, since λ was actually
well-ordered, it follows that LM is well-founded beyond its ω1. Consider the state-
ment “there is a countable transitive set having no end-extension to a model of
ZFC + V = L.” This is a Σ12 sentence, which is true in M
+[G] by our assumption
about m, and so by Shoenfield absoluteness, it is true in LM
+
and hence also LM .
So LM thinks there is a countable transitive set b having no end-extension to a
model of ZFC+V = L. This is a Π11 assertion about b, whose truth is witnessed in
LM by a ranking of the associated tree. Since this rank would be countable in LM
and this model is well-founded up to its ω1, the tree must be actually well-founded.
But this is impossible, since it is not actually true that b has no such end-extension,
since LM itself is such an end-extension of b. Contradiction. 
Observe that if one desires to have a covering end-extension this is easily obtained
by using the Keisler–Morley theorem to extend the end-extension further to an
elementary end-extension.
We should like to note conversely that the Barwise extension theorem is an
immediate consequence of our main theorem, which can be seen as a generalization
of it. Specifically, the Barwise theorem follows from statement (4) of the main
theorem, simply by taking ZF to be the theory ZFC + V = L. Every model of ZF
has an inner model of ZFC+V = L, and so the main theorem shows that not only
does every countable model of ZF have an end-extension to a model of ZFC+V = L,
but it has such an extension in which the original model is covered, making every
element of it countable, and for which we may also control the universal sequence
however we desire.
Indeed, the main theorem provides an array of strengthenings of the Barwise
extension theorem. For example, corollary 9 shows that every countable model of set
theory with a measurable cardinal has a covering end-extension to a model of ZFC+
V = L[µ]; every countable model of set theory with extender-based large cardinals
has a covering end-extension to a model satisfying V = L[ ~E]; and every countable
model of set theory with infinitely many Woodin cardinals and a measurable above
has a covering end-extension to a model of ZF + AD + V = L(R). And there are
many further interesting cases, where one end-extends a given countable model of
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set theory to a model satisfying a theory holding in a sufficient submodel of the
original model.
3. The Σ1-definable universal finite sequence for end-extensions
Let us now prove the main theorem. We restate it here for the benefit of the
reader.
Main Theorem. For any computably axiomatizable theory ZF extending ZF, there
is a Σ1-definable finite sequence
a0, a1, . . . , an
with the following properties:
(1) ZF proves that the sequence is finite.
(2) In any transitive model M of ZF, the sequence is empty.
(3) If M is a countable model of ZF in which the sequence is s and t ∈ M is
any finite sequence (in the sense of M) extending s, then there is a covering
end-extension of M to a model N |= ZF in which the sequence is exactly t,
and in which every set of M is countable.
(4) Indeed, for statements (2) and (3), it suffices merely that M |= ZF and
end-extends a submodel W |= ZF of height at least (ωL1 )
M .
Proof. We undertake an analogue of the universal finite set construction of [HW17],
a construction which is itself a set-theoretic generalization of the universal algo-
rithm [Woo11; Bla17; BE17; Ham18b], but combining it with the ideas of Hamkins’s
proof of the Barwise extension theorem in section 2.
Fix a computable enumeration of the theory ZF, to be used in all the models
of set theory in which we refer to this theory, and let ZFk be the finite theory
consisting of the first k many axioms appearing in this enumeration.
As explained in [Ham18b], it will suffice for us to establish a weaker extension
property, the adding-one extension property, which asserts that if s is the sequence
defined inM then for any object a inM there is a covering end-extensionN in which
the defined sequence is saa. That is, the adding-one extension property allows one
to extend the sequence by appending exactly one new object on the end, rather
than a finite sequence. By iterating this property, of course, one can eventually
append any standard-finite sequence, but such an inductive argument, it turns
out, cannot establish the full extension property for nonstandard-finite extensions,
for there are sequences with the adding-one extension property that do not have
the full extension property.1 Nevertheless, from any sequence with the adding-one
extension property, one can define a new sequence with the arbitrary extension
property. For example, one could simply concatenate all the finite sequences that
appear on the given adding-one sequence. In this way, by adding one object to the
original sequence, we can add an arbitrary (possibly nonstandard) finite sequence
to the derived concatenated sequence. Therefore, for the rest of this proof, we shall
aim only for the adding-one extension property.
1For example, the main process A sequence we define in this proof has the adding-one extension
property, but not the arbitrary extension property, because the total length of the sequence will
be bounded by k0, a bound which is known once the first stage is successful.
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As in [HW17], we shall describe two set-theoretic processes, A and B. These
processes are intended to be run inside, respectively, ω-nonstandard models and ω-
standard models and will then be merged in a way that provides a single definition
fulfilling the desired properties.
Process A. We start by describing process A, intended to be run inside ω-
nonstandard models as an internal process, using whatever nonstandard natural
numbers are to be found there. The process proceeds in a sequence of stages, placing
one object onto the sequence at each successful stage. Stage n succeeds and an is
defined, if there is a transitive set mn, countable in L and containing as elements
all earlier mi for stages i < n, and a natural number kn, smaller than all earlier ki,
such that an ∈ mn and the structure 〈mn,∈〉 has no covering end-extension to a
model
〈
N,∈N
〉
satisfying ZFkn , making every set in mn countable, and placing this
very object an onto its own A sequence at stage n as the last element. In slogan
form: we place an object onto the sequence, if we find a countable transitive set
having no covering end-extension in which we would have done so as the next and
last element. This is altogether a ∆1-property of the data (mn, an, kn), since the
non-existence of such a model N is a Π11 assertion, whose truth can be verified by
the ordinal ranking of the canonically associated well-founded tree. In particular,
if there is such an end-extension, then there is one in L and countable in L. The
process officially accepts and uses the triple (mn, an, kn), whose witnesses for this
property are L-least. In other words, we accept the first triple to be verified in
the L hierarchy, and use this triple to define an. The map n 7→ (mn, kn, an) is
accordingly Σ1-definable.
Although the definition may at first appear circular—we define an, after all, by
reference to the definition of the process A sequence inside N—one may use the
Go¨del–Carnap fixed point lemma to find a definition ψ(n, a) for the map n 7→ an
that solves this recursion, allowing ψ as described to refer to its own Go¨del code pψq.
The same method is used in [HW17], and one should view this as analogous to the
common use of the Kleene recursion theorem in computability-theoretic arguments,
including its use in the universal algorithm [Woo11; Ham18b].
Since the natural numbers kn are descending, there will be only finitely many
successful stages, and so the sequence will be finite.
We claim that in the relevant models, every kn arising from a successful stage
is nonstandard; in particular, ω-standard models will have no successful process A
stages. To see this, consider any countable model of set theory M |= ZF, which
end-extends a submodel W |= ZF of height at least (ωL1 )
M , and let n be the last
successful stage in M . Since the definition is Σ1, it is absolute between M and W .
For any standard k, by reflection the theory ZFk is true in a transitive set N ∈W ,
large enough to include mn as a countable set and the witnesses for the successful
stages. Consequently,
〈
N,∈W
〉
|= ZFk and thinks object an was added at stage
n as the last object on the sequence. If kn ≤ k, this would violate the success of
stage n in M , since mn would have had such a covering end-extension after all.
Therefore k < kn for every standard k, and so kn is nonstandard.
It remains to verify the extension property. Let M be a countable model of
ZF set theory in which the sequence is s. (We don’t actually need the submodel
W of ZF for this part of the argument, provided that the earlier ki, if any, are
nonstandard.) Let n be the first unsuccessful stage. Let k be nonstandard, but
smaller than all previous ki. Since stage n did not succeed, it follows that for any
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transitive set m countable in LM and containing the earlier mi, and for any set
a ∈ m, the structure 〈m,∈〉
M
does have a covering end-extension in M to a model
making every set in m countable and satisfying ZFk+“object a was placed onto
the sequence at stage n, the last successful stage,” since otherwise stage n would
have succeeded. Further, for a given m, the existence of such an end-extension
is a Σ1 property of the data (m, a, k), and so we may find the extensions in L.
Therefore, LM thinks that for every countable set a and every countable transitive
set m, there is a covering end-extension of 〈m,∈〉 to a model
〈
N,∈N
〉
making
every set in m countable and satisfying ZFk+“object a is placed onto the sequence
at stage n, the last successful stage.” This is a Π12 assertion (∀a,m ∃N . . .), which
by Shoenfield is therefore also true in M itself. By the Keisler–Morley theorem,
M has an elementary end-extension M+, and so the statement will also be true
in M+, as well as in all its forcing extensions, by Shoenfield absoluteness. Let
θ be an ordinal of M+ above M , and let M+[G] be a forcing extension making
VM
+
θ countable. Thus, for any object a in M , we have a countable transitive set
m = VM
+
θ in M
+[G], which by our observations must therefore have a covering
end-extension N in M+[G] making every set in m countable and in which ZFk
holds, plus the assertion that process A places object a onto the sequence at stage
n, the last successful stage. Since N end-extends VM
+
θ , which end-extends M , and
since k is nonstandard, we have therefore found the desired covering end-extension
of M to a model of ZF making every set in M countable and placing a as the next
and last element on the sequence.
Process B. We turn now to process B, intended to be run as an internal
process inside ω-standard models, using whatever (possibly nonstandard) ordinals
are to be found there. The process will proceed in a sequence of stages, just as
before, with each successful stage adding one object an to the sequence. Stage n
is successful and an is defined, if there is a transitive set mn countable in L and a
countable ordinal λn, with mi ∈ mn and λn < λi for all earlier stages i < n, and
with λn ∈ mn and a set an ∈ mn, such that the structure 〈mn,∈〉 has no covering
end-extension to a model
〈
N,∈N
〉
making every set in mn countable and satisfying
ZF+“process B places object an on the sequence at stage n, the last successful
stage,” and furthermore, this property about (mn, an, λn), which has complexity
Π11, has rank λn in the canonical representation of Π
1
1 assertions by well-founded
trees. The acceptability of the data triple is a Σ1 property, witnessed by the ranking
function, and we officially accept the triple whose witness appears least in the L
order. So the map n 7→ an is Σ1 definable.
Once again, the circularity in the definition can be removed by the Go¨del–Carnap
fixed-point theorem. Since the ordinals λn are descending, there will be only finitely
many successful stages, and so the sequence is finite.
We claim that the ordinals λn in the relevant models are nonstandard. Suppose
thatM is a countable model of ZF that end-extends a submodel W of ZF of height
at least (ωL1 )
M , and let n be the last successful stage in M . Since the definition is
Σ1, it is absolute betweenM andW , and soW thinks that ZF holds, plus object an
is placed onto the sequence at stage n, the last successful stage. So the statement
asserting at stage n that mn has no covering end-extension and so on is actually
false, since W itself is such an extension. So the tree representing the statement,
which is determined the same inM as for us in the set-theoretic background because
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M is an ω-model, is not actually well-founded. But M thought it was well-founded
with rank λn, and so λn must be nonstandard.
Let us now prove the extension property for process B in countable ω-standard
models M |= ZF end-extending a submodel W |= ZF of height at least (ωL1 )
M .
Suppose the sequence is s in M . Let n be the first unsuccessful stage, and consider
any set a in M . By the Keisler–Morley theorem, we may find a countable elemen-
tary end-extension of M to a model M+. Let θ be an ordinal of M+ above M ,
and let M+[G] be a forcing extension in which m = VM
+
θ is made countable. If
〈m,∈M
+
〉 has a covering end-extension to a model of ZF in which every set of m
is made countable and object a is placed onto the sequence at stage n as the last
successful stage, then we’d be done, since this would also serve as the desired end-
extension of the original modelM . So let us assume toward contradiction that there
is no such end-extension of 〈m,∈M
+
〉. This is a Π11 assertion about m in M
+[G],
which therefore has some ordinal rank λ there in the representation of Π11 asser-
tions by well-founded trees. Since the statement is really true (in the set-theoretic
background of our universe), it follows that λ must be in the well-founded part of
M+[G]. In particular, λ < λi all i < n, since those ordinals are nonstandard. So
M+[G] thinks that “there is a countable transitive set m containing all the earlier
mi and the witnesses for the success of the Σ1 definition at those earlier stages and
an element a ∈ m, such that the assertion that 〈m,∈〉 has no covering end-extension
to a model making every set in m countable and satisfying T+“object a is placed
onto the sequence at stage n, the last successful stage” has ordinal rank λ.” This is
a Σ1 assertion about λ and the countable set containing the data and witnesses for
the earlier successful stages of the process, since it is witnessed by the countable
transitive set m and a ∈ m and the ranking function of the tree that is canonically
associated with the non-extension assertion about m.
If λ happens to be countable in LM
+
, then all the parameters of the assertion
are countable in LM , and so it follows by Le´vy reflection that the statement is true
in LM
+
and hence in LM . So LM has a countable transitive set m, containing
the witnesses for the earlier successful stages and an object a ∈ m, such that the
assertion that m has no covering end-extension to a model of ZF making every set
in m countable and in which a is placed at stage n, the last stage, has rank λ. But
in this case, stage n would have succeeded, contradicting our assumption that it
was the first unsuccessful stage.
So we may assume λ is uncountable in LM
+
. In this case, since λ was actually
well-ordered, it follows that LM is well-founded beyond its ω1. This implies that
there could have been no earlier successful stages in M , since the λi must be
nonstandard countable ordinals in LM . Thus, n = 0, or in other words, there is
nothing yet on the sequence. Consider the statement “there is a countable transitive
set m with an element a ∈ m, such that m has no covering end-extension to a
model of ZF making every set in m countable, in which the sequence is 〈a〉, having
exactly one successful stage.” This is a Σ12 sentence, which is true in M
+[G] by our
assumption aboutm, and so by Shoenfield absoluteness, it is true in LM
+
and hence
also in LM . So LM thinks there is a countable transitive set m with an element
a ∈ m, such that m has no covering end-extension to a model of ZF in which every
set in m is countable and the sequence is exactly 〈a〉. But in this case, there would
have been a successful stage after all, contrary to what we proved earlier.
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Altogether, therefore, we conclude that VM
+
θ must have had the desired end-
extension after all, and so we’ve verified the extension property of process B for
the relevant countable ω-standard models of set theory.
Process C. We shall now merge processes A and B into a single process C,
providing a single uniform Σ1 definition that will work in all the relevant countable
models of set theory. Process C proceeds in stages. At each successful stage, it will
place one new object onto the sequence, either for an A-reason or for a B-reason.
The A-reasons will involve data (mn, an, kn), and the B-reasons will involve data
(mn, an, λn), where we insist thatmn is a transitive set countable in L andmi ∈ mn
for the mi used for either reason at earlier stages i < n, that an ∈ mn, and that
kn < ki for the earlier A-reason stages i < n, if this is an A-reason stage, and
λn < λi for the earlier B-reason stages, if this is a B-reason stage; once there has
been a successful A-reason stage, then we proceed only with the A-reason stages;
as before, the data is acceptable if mn has no covering end-extension to a model〈
N,∈N
〉
making every set in mn countable and satisfying the relevant theory (using
ZFkn at A-reason stages and full ZF at B-reason stages) plus the assertion that
this new process C has exactly one new successful stage, placing object an onto the
process C sequence, and furthermore, in the B-reason case, the assertion that there
is no such N has rank λn. The acceptability of such a data triple is a Σ1 property,
since it is verified for each reason type by the rankings of certain trees, as with
processes A and B above. A stage is successful if any data is verified as acceptable
for it, and we use the data and the reason type whose witness appears first in the
L-order. This defines the process C sequence n 7→ an, which has complexity Σ1.
We complete the argument by observing that our process A and B analysis
goes through for process C. The sequence is finite since the kn and λn can go
down only finitely many times. At any A-reason stage, the number kn must be
nonstandard, and at any B-reason stage, the ordinal λn must be nonstandard. In
any ω-nonstandard model, we achieve the extension property for process C for the
same reasons as process A; and in any ω-standard model, we achieve the extension
property for process C just as with process B. 
As an immediate corollary, let us see that we can get a universal finite sequence
for extensions in the L-hierarchy, which was our original motivation for this project.
If M and N are models of V = L, say that N is an L-extension of M if M is an
initial segment in the Lα-hierarchy for M . Compare this to the notion of a rank-
extension, where N is a rank-extension of M if M is an initial segment in the
Vα-hierarchy for N .
Corollary 3 (Universal finite sequence for L-extensions). There is a Σ1-definable
sequence
a0, . . . , an
with the following properties:
(1) ZF proves the sequence is finite.
(2) In any transitive model of ZF, the sequence is empty.
(3) If M is a countable model of ZFC + V = L in which the sequence is s
and t ∈M is any finite sequence extending s, then there is an L-extension
N |= ZFC + V = L of M in which every set in M is countable and the
sequence is exactly t.
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Proof. This follows from the main theorem using ZF = ZFC + V = L and the
observation that among models of V = L being an end-extension is equivalent to
being an L-extension. 
In the context of models of arithmetic, the universal algorithm exhibited the
extension property with respect to all models of arithmetic, not just the countable
models. But in the context of set theory, we achieve the extension property of the
universal finite sequence in the main theorem only for the countable models of set
theory. This was because at certain points in the proof, we made key use of some
results, such as the Keisler–Morley theorem, which hold for the countable models
of set theory but not generally.
It is therefore natural to inquire whether this limitation can be removed. Can
there be a Σ1-definable universal finite sequence exhibiting the extension property
for all models of set theory, including uncountable models? That would make the
situation analogous with the universal algorithm for models of arithmetic.
Alas, the answer is no. If there are sufficiently well-founded uncountable models,
then there can be no generalization of the universal finite sequence to uncountable
models of set theory. Specifically, suppose that M is model of set theory that is
well-founded at least to true ω1. We claim that no end-extension of M can have
new Σ1 facts, and in particular, the universal sequence cannot gain new elements
in an end-extension. The reason is that if N is an end-extension of M , then any
Σ1 fact true in N is true in L
N
ω1
by Le´vy absoluteness, and this latter model cannot
exceed the true Lω1 , for then we would have collapsed the true ω1 to be countable.
Meanwhile, the question would remain whether that is the only kind of exception.
Question 4. Does the main theorem generalize to the case of uncountable models
of set theory, whose well-founded part does not include true ω1?
4. A refined version of the main theorem, with applications
We should like now to prove a refined version of the main theorem, by isolating
exactly the features one needs of the theory in order to undertake the proof of the
main theorem.
One feature of the theory ZF that we had used was that it satisfied a form of
the reflection theorem. It will turn out, however, that a weak form of reflection will
suffice. Specifically, let us define that a theory T is reflexive to transitive sets, if for
any finitely many axioms of T , the theory proves that those axioms hold cofinally
in the transitive sets. The difference between this and full reflection is that here,
we reflect only assertions of the theory, rather than arbitrary true assertions.
The theory ZF and all its extensions are reflexive to transitive sets, of course, by
the reflection theorem. But also, the theory ZFC−+V = L is reflexive to transitive
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sets, where ZFC− is Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory without the power set axiom,2
since one can reflect along the L-hierarchy. Meanwhile, KP is not reflexive, nor is
any finitely axiomatizable theory. In general, the reflexive property is weaker than
the reflection theorem for T , since models of ZFC−, for example, do not necessarily
satisfy the reflection theorem, as proved in [FKG19], but nevertheless, the theory
is reflexive to transitive sets, since if M |= ZFC− and a ∈ M , then we can code
a with a set of ordinals A ∈ M and consider L[A]M , which is a model of ZFC−
containing a and having an Ord-hierarchy, which is enough to prove the reflection
theorem. So we get transitive models of the form Lα[A] satisfying any desired finite
fragment of ZFC− and containing the set a.
Another consequence of ZF that we used in the main argument was the character-
ization of Π11 assertions via well-founded trees. According to [Sim09, lemma V.1.8],
however, this characterization is provable in ACA0. In particular, it will be provable
in any set theory extending KP, and KP is sufficient to provide ordinal rankings of
those trees.
It follows that Π11 assertions about reals are absolute between a model M of KP
and its end-extensions N |= KP, since if the statement is true in the smaller model
M , then it has the ordinal ranking of the tree, which will still exist in the larger
model, verifying the Π11 statement there; and if the statement fails in the smaller
model, then it has the counterexample real, which will still exist in the larger model.
The Le´vy reflection theorem, asserting that Σ1 assertions in set theory are ab-
solute to LωL1 , follows from Π
1
1-absoluteness. The upward direction is immediate;
conversely, if a Σ1 assertion is true in M , then by Lo¨wenheim–Skolem there is
a countable witness, and this amounts to the truth of a Σ11 assertion, which is
therefore absolute to LMω1 .
The Shoenfield absoluteness principle, however, the assertion that Σ12 assertions
about reals are absolute between models with the same countable ordinals, appears
to be strictly stronger. Shoenfield absoluteness is provable in Π11-CA0, according
to [Sim09, theorem VII.4.14], and this seems to place it outside of KP. So we shall
need to impose an extra assumption on the theory S concerning this.
In the proof of the main theorem, we had used the Keisler–Morley theorem, stat-
ing that every countable model M of ZF has an elementary end-extension M+. A
closer inspection of the proof, however, will reveal that a somewhat weaker property
will suffice. Specifically, what we shall need in theorem 6 is merely that for every
countable model M of the theory, there is a Σ1-elementary covering end-extension
M+ satisfying the theory (or at least satisfying the Shoenfield absoluteness prop-
erty).
While all extensions of ZF have this property, it turns out that KP does not.
Specifically, LωCK1 , the minimum transitive model of KP plus the axiom of infinity,
can have no such covering Σ1-elementary end-extension (Ali Enayat proved this in
email correspondence). Meanwhile, Kaufmann [Kau81] shows that satisfying Σn-
collection implies the existence of a Σn-elementary end-extension, for n ≥ 2. An
easy modification of his argument gives that we may assume the end-extension to
be covering.
With the above discussion in mind, we make the following definition.
2By ZFC−, we mean here, as one should, the theory axiomatized with the separation and
collection schemata, rather than the replacement schema. These are not equivalent without the
power set axiom, as proved by Zarach [Zar96]; see also [GHJ16].
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Definition 5. A pair of theories S and T are suitable for the Σ1-definable universal
sequence, provided that theory S has the following properties
(1) S extends KP.
(2) Countable models of S satisfy Σ12 absoluteness to L and to their forcing
extensions.
(3) Every countable modelM |= S has a Σ1-elementary covering end-extension
M+, which also satisfies the Σ12 absoluteness to its L and forcing extensions.
and the theory T has the following properties
(1) T extends KP.
(2) T is computably enumerable.
(3) T is reflexive to transitive sets.
A theory T is suitable all by itself, if it has all the properties, making a suitable
pair with itself.
It is clear that ZF, and indeed any computably enumerable extension of ZF, is
suitable. Our earlier discussion shows that ZF− also is suitable.
We can now carry out the proof of the main theorem for these suitable theories.
Theorem 6. Assume that theories S and T are suitable for the Σ1-definable uni-
versal finite sequence, as defined above. Then there is a Σ1-definable finite sequence
a0, a1, . . . , an
with the following properties:
(1) S proves that the sequence is finite.
(2) In any transitive model M of T , the sequence is empty.
(3) If M is a countable model of T in which the sequence is s and t ∈M is any
finite sequence (in the sense of M) extending s, then there is a covering
end-extension of M to a model N |= T in which the sequence is exactly t,
and in which every set in M becomes countable in N .
(4) Indeed, for statements (2) and (3), it suffices merely that M |= S and
end-extends a submodel W |= T of height at least (ωL1 )
M .
Proof. We use the argument of the main theorem, paying attention to exactly
what is needed of the theories in order to carry out the argument. Succinctly, the
combined process proceeds in stages, with stage n successful either for an A reason
(mn, an, kn) or for a B reason (mn, an, λn), where mn is a transitive set which is
countable in L, an ∈ mn and the structure 〈mn,∈〉 has no covering end-extension
to a model
〈
N,∈N
〉
in which every set in mn is countable and an was placed on
the sequence as the nth and last element and such that furthermore (i) in the A
case, N satisfies Tkn and kn < ki for all earlier A-reason stages i < n; or (ii) in the
B case, N satisfies T and the assertion that there is no such N has rank λn, which
is smaller than all λi at earlier B-reason stages i < n. Once an A-reason stage has
succeeded, we proceed only with A-reason stages. The circularity of the definition
is resolved via the Go¨del–Carnap fixed-point lemma. The acceptability of the data
triple is a ∆1 property, and we officially accept the first triple to be verified in the
L hierarchy. Thus, the map n 7→ an is Σ1-definable.
There will be only finitely many successful stages, because the kn and λn are
descending.
At a successful A-reason stage in a model M |= S end-extending a submodel
W |= T of height at least (ωL1 )
M , the number kn must be nonstandard. To see this,
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assume without loss that n is the last successful stage, and consider any standard
finite k. By the reflexive property of T , there is a transitive set N in W that
satisfies Tk and contains all the witnesses for the stages up to an including stage n,
and in which every set in mn becomes countable. So N is a covering end-extension
of mn that satisfies Tk and places an onto the sequence at stage n as the last object
(there can’t be additional successes in N , since the Σ1 definition would be upward
absolute to M). This would contradict the success of stage n unless k < kn, and
so kn is nonstandard.
At a successful B-reason stage in an ω-model M |= S end-extending a submodel
W |= T of height at least (ωL1 )
M , the ordinal λn is nonstandard. To see this,
suppose n is the last successful stage, and observe that W itself is a covering end-
extension of mn in which every set in mn is countable, T holds, and an was placed
onto the sequence as the final element. So the assertion that mn has no such end
extension is not actually true, despite it being evaluated as true with rank λn. Since
the tree is the same for us as in M , since it is ω-standard, it follows that λn is not
actually well-founded.
We claim that the extension property holds in countable ω-nonstandardM |= S
end-extending a submodel W |= T of height at least (ωL1 )
M , for an A reason. To
see this, let n be the first unsuccessful stage and consider any nonstandard k below
the earlier ki, if any. For every sufficiently large countable transitive set m in L
M
and object a ∈ m, there must be a covering end-extension to a model N of Tk
in which every set in m is countable and a is placed onto the sequence as the
next and last element, for otherwise stage n would have succeeded. This is a Π12
property, which therefore holds in M by the suitability of theory S. Again by the
suitability of S, there is a Σ1-elementary end-extension M
+, with a transitive set
m ∈M+ covering M . The Π12 statement remains true in M
+, by Σ1-elementarity,
since otherwise, there would be a countable transitive set in M+ with a certain Π11
property, which is witnessed by a ranking, and this is a Σ1 assertion that fails in
M . By the suitability of S, the Π12 statement remains true in a forcing extension
M+[G] in which m has become countable. Therefore, there is a covering end-
extension
〈
N,∈N
〉
of 〈m,∈M
+
〉 making every set in m countable, satisfying T , and
placing whichever object a ∈M we like as the next and last object on the sequence.
Since N end-extends and coversm, which end-extends
〈
M,∈M
〉
, we have found the
desired extension.
We also claim that the extension property holds in countable ω-standard models
M |= S end-extending a submodel W |= T of height at least (ωL1 )
M , for a B
reason. To see this, let M+ be a suitable Σ1-elementary end-extension of M , with
a transitive covering set m, and let M+[G] be a forcing extension in which m is
countable. Consider any a ∈ M . Let n be the first unsuccessful stage. Assume
that m has no covering end-extension N |= T making every set in m countable
and placing a as the next and last object on the sequence, because otherwise, we
would be done. So the rank λ of the assertion in M+[G] that there is no such N
is well-founded, because the statement is actually true. Thus, it is smaller than
any earlier λi, since these are nonstandard. If λ is countable in L
M+ , then the
assertion that there is a transitive set, containing all the earlier witnesses, having
no covering end-extension N |= T making every set in m countable and placing
an additional object onto the sequence, with rank λ for this assertion, would be a
Σ12 statement in these parameters true in M
+[G] and therefore by the Shoenfield
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property of S also true in M+ and therefore true in LM , which would have made
stage n successful, contrary to our assumption that n was the first unsuccessful
stage. If λ is uncountable in LM
+
, then LM is well-founded beyond its ω1, and so
there could have been no successful stages yet. In particular, for every countable
transitive set in LM and every element a of that set, there must be a covering
end-extension
〈
N,∈N
〉
|= T in which the elements of that set becomes countable
and the sequence is precisely 〈a〉. This is a Π12 sentence in L
M , which is therefore
true in M and hence in M+ and hence in M+[G]. And so the covering set m must
have such an extension, as desired. 
Question 7. Are there more generous notions of suitability, for which the conclu-
sions of the main theorem can still be established?
We can drop the reflexive-to-transitive-sets requirement on the theory T , for
example, if we are willing to have the universal extension property for the sequence
only in ω-standard models, because our process B analysis did not require that
reflexive property. But can we drop that requirement in any case?
Just as the main theorem had the Barwise extension theorem as an immediate
consequence, we also get the following consequence of the generalized version of the
theorem.
Corollary 8. Assume S and T are suitable theories, in the sense of definition 5.
Then for every countable model M |= S end-extending a submodel W |= T of height
at least (ωL1 )
M , there is a covering end-extension of M to a model of T , and indeed,
one in which every set of M becomes countable.
In slogan form, the corollary expresses what can be seen as a sweeping new
multiverse modal principle: any statement true in an inner model is true again in
an end-extension.
This corollary is an immediate consequence of theorem 6 statement (4), but one
can also give a direct proof of the same style as we gave in section 2 for the Barwise
extension theorem.
We are fascinated by some of the particular instances of this phenomenon. For
example, if M has a measurable cardinal κ, then we can collapse it by forcing,
so that M [G] thinks κ is now a countable ordinal. But nevertheless, there will
be an end-extension N of M [G] which again has a measurable cardinal—a new
measurable cardinal is resurrected.
Corollary 9.
(1) Every countable model M of ZFC with a measurable cardinal has a covering
end-extension to a model N of ZFC+ V = L[µ].
(2) Every countable model M of ZFC with extender-based large cardinals has a
covering end-extension to a model N satisfying ZFC+ V = L[ ~E].
(3) Every countable model M of ZFC with infinitely many Woodin cardinals
and a measurable above has a covering end-extension to a model N of ZF+
AD+ V = L(R).
(4) And in each case, we can furthermore arrange that every set of M is count-
able in the extension model N .
By theorem 6, we can of course also control the universal Σ1 sequence in such
end-extensions.
THE Σ1-DEFINABLE UNIVERSAL FINITE SEQUENCE 15
5. End-extensional potentialism
We should like now to draw out the consequences of the main theorem for set-
theoretic end-extensional potentialism. Consider the potentialist system consisting
of the countable models of set theory, a multiverse of models of set theory, forming
a Kripke model under the end-extension relation. (Let us consider the models of a
fixed suitable theory T , such as any computably enumerable theory ZF extending
ZF.) In this potentialist system we may naturally interpret the modal operators,
so ϕ is true in a model M , if there is an end-extension in which ϕ is true; and
ϕ is true in M , if all end-extensions satisfy ϕ. This is therefore a version of
potentialism—one of many in set theory—as described in [HL18]. Let us call it
end-extensional potentialism.
Linnebo and others [Lin13; LS17; HL18] have emphasized the contrast between
height-potentialism and width-potentialism in the philosophy of set theory, where
with height-potentialism the set-theoretic universe fragments can grow taller, per-
haps adding new ordinals on top, while with width-potentialism, the universe grows
outward, perhaps adding new subsets to old sets as with forcing.
End-extensional potentialism is naturally a form both of height-potentialism and
width-potentialism, since the extensions of a model can extend the ordinals of that
model to taller ordinals and also new subsets of old sets can appear in an end-
extension.
Theorem 10. The modal logic of end-extensional potentialism, for the countable
models of any fixed suitable set theory, is exactly S4.
Proof. The reason is that we have sufficient railyards, just as in [Ham18b; HW17],
and from this it follows that the potentialist validities are exactly S4. The railyard
method is described in detail in [Ham18b, theorem 28], but let us sketch how the
argument proceeds. The universal finite sequence can be used to assign labels on
any finite pre-tree, by interpreting the sequence as describing a path in the tree.
Namely, starting at the root of the tree, if a subsequent element of the universal
sequence is a node of the tree that is accessible from your current position, then
move to that node and continue this process. By the universal extension property
of the sequence, we can always find end-extensions where this path places you at
any desired accessible node. The models of set theory each correspond to a node
in the tree via these descriptions, and this implies that truth in any propositional
Kripke model on this frame can be translated into potentialist truth in the models
of set theory. Since the finite pre-tree frames are complete for S4, any propositional
modal assertion not in S4 fails in some propositional Kripke model whose frame is
a finite pre-tree, and so the railyard labelings of this tree provide similarly a failing
instance of that formula in the potentialist system. So the validities are contained
within S4, and since S4 is valid, the validities are exactly S4. 
We also find it natural to consider a related and somewhat more permissive
potentialist system, the ∆0-elementary potentialist system, which consists of the
countable models of set theory, ordered by ∆0-elementary extension, rather than
just end-extension. That is, N extends M in this potentialist system if M is a
∆0-elementary submodel of N . Since end-extensions are ∆0-elementary, this is
somewhat more permissive than end-extensional potentialism.
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Corollary 11. The modal logic of ∆0-elementary potentialism, for the countable
models of any fixed suitable set theory, is exactly S4.
Proof. The point is, the universal finite sequence for end-extensions gives us suffi-
cient railyards for this potentialist system. The universal finite sequence for end-
extensions gives us the needed ∆0-elementary extensions satisfying the new facts.
And if M is a ∆0-elementary submodel of N then N agrees with the Σ1-theory of
M , so the universal finite sequence as defined in N must end-extend the sequence
as defined in M . 
6. The end-extensional maximality principle
In this section we introduce and investigate the end-extensional maximality prin-
ciple, as well as the corresponding maximality principle for ∆0-elementary exten-
sions of models of set theory.
Definition 12. The maximality principle is true at a model M in a potentialist
system, if M |= ϕ→ ϕ for any assertion ϕ in the language of M .
Thus, the end-extensional maximality principle asserts that every possibly nec-
essary statement is already true, in the potentialist system consisting of the count-
able models of set theory under end-extension, and similarly, the ∆0-elementary-
extensional maximality principle makes this assertion with respect to ∆0-elementary
extensions.
In these two cases, the main theorem of the article shows that we cannot allow
parameters into the scheme, even merely natural number parameters, because the
assertion that the universal sequence is defined at n is a possibly necessary state-
ment that will not yet be true for large enough n. (Meanwhile, in various other
potentialist systems, such as those considered in [HL18], one can sometimes allow
parameters into the scheme, or certain kinds of parameters.) For this reason, it
is also clear that no ω-standard model of set theory can satisfy the maximality
principle, since standard natural numbers are absolutely definable.
Let us begin by establishing that end-extensional and ∆0-elementary possibility
for assertions in the language of set theory, in the context of ω-nonstandard models,
are equivalent to each other, and furthermore this kind of possibility is expressible
as a first-order scheme in the language of set theory.
We found it worthwhile to aim for a somewhat general version of this result, and
so let us say that a theory T is very suitable, if (i) T is suitable; (ii) T satisfies the
Keisler-Morley theorem, meaning that every countable model of T has a covering
elementary end-extension; (iii) T proves the Mostowski collapse lemma; and (iv)
T proves the reflection scheme with countable parameters, namely, if ϕ(a) holds of
a hereditarily countable set a, then every set is contained in a transitive model of
ϕ(a).
This notion is stronger than the merely suitable theories, and perhaps the main
interest is simply the theory ZFC itself. In particular, it follows from well-known
facts that ZF is very suitable, as well as every computably enumerable extension of
ZF; and ZF− + V = L also is very suitable. On the other hand, work of Friedman,
Gitman, and Kanovei [FKG19] shows that ZF− is not very suitable.
Theorem 13 (Characterization of end-extensional possibility). Consider any count-
able ω-nonstandard model
〈
M,∈M
〉
in the potentialist system of a fixed very suitable
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set theory T , such as ZF or any c.e. extension of ZF. In particular T is computably
enumerable and accordingly let Tk is the subtheory of T consisting of the first k
axioms along a fixed enumeration. For any assertion ϕ(a) in the language of set
theory about a countable object a ∈M , the following are equivalent:
(1) M |= ϕ(a) in the end-extensional potentialist system of the countable
models of T . That is, M has an end-extension satisfying T and ϕ(a).
(2) M |= ϕ(a) in the ∆0-elementary potentialist system. That is, M has a
∆0-elementary extension satisfying T and ϕ(a).
(3) M thinks of every countable transitive set m ∋ a and every standard number
k that the structure
〈
m,∈M
〉
end-extends to a model
〈
n,∈N
〉
|= Tk +ϕ(a).
(4) M thinks of every real x and every standard natural number k that there is
an ω-model of Tk + ϕ(a) which contains x.
(5) (For sentences) ϕ is consistent with T plus the Σ1-theory of M
Proof. (1⇒ 2) This is immediate, since every end-extension is ∆0-elementary.
(2 ⇒ 3) Suppose toward a contradiction that (2) holds and (3) fails. Fix k
witnessing the failure and fix countable transitive m ∈ M so that M thinks m
has no end-extension to a model of Tk + ϕ(a). This is a Π
1
1 fact about m and
a, so M has a ranking function witnessing that the tree corresponding to the Π11
fact is well-founded. This ranking function will remain a ranking function in any
∆0-elementary extension, so any such extension must agree that m has no such
end-extension. By (2), let N be a ∆0-elementary extension ofM in which T +ϕ(a)
holds. Since the Keisler–Morley theorem holds for T , we may assume without loss
that N is a covering extension, with c ∈ N so that N |= x ∈ c for each x ∈ M .
By the very suitable reflection scheme, c has an end-extension in N to a model of
Tk + ϕ(a). This end-extension of c is also an end-extension of m, and so N thinks
that m has an end-extension to a model of Tk + ϕ(a), a contradiction.
(3⇒ 1) By overspill there is a nonstandard k so that M thinks every countable
transitive set end-extends to a model of Tk+ϕ(a). By the Keisler–Morley theorem
for T , let M+ be a countable elementary end-extension of M with a covering set
m, and let M+[G] be a forcing extension which collapses m to be countable. The
assertion that every countable transitive set end-extends to a model of Tk+ϕ(a) is
Π12, and thus by Shoenfield absoluteness we can transfer its truth inM
+ toM+[G].
So M+[G] sees an end-extension of m satisfying Tk + ϕ(a). This end-extension
witnesses that M satisfies ϕ(a).
(3 ⇔ 4) This is a standard fact, using the Mostowski collapse lemma to use
that an arbitrary countable transitive set can be coded by a real. Note that this
equivalence does not need M to be ω-nonstandard nor most of the assumptions on
T .
(1⇒ 5) The Σ1-theory of a model is preserved by going to end-extensions, so if
ϕ holds in some end-extension of M then it must be consistent with the Σ1-theory
of M .
(5⇒ 3) Let N be a model of T + ϕ plus the Σ1-theory of M . By the reflection
principle satisfied by T we get that N thinks that every countable transitive set is
contained in a model of Tk+ϕ, for any standard k. Suppose toward a contradiction
that (3) fails, so for some standard k, the model M thinks there is a countable
transitive set m with no end-extension to a model of Tk + ϕ. As in the argument
for (1⇒ 2), this is a Π11 fact aboutm and so its truth inM is witnessed by a certain
well-founded tree with a ranking function to the ordinals. The assertion there is
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such m thus appears in the Σ1-theory of M . So N must think there is a countable
transitive set with no end-extension to a model of Tk + ϕ, a contradiction. 
It follows as a corollary that if M |= ϕ(a), either with end-extensional or
∆0-elementary-extensional potentialism, then there is a concrete reason for this,
namely, there is some standard k and some countable transitive set m ∋ a in M
such that M thinks m has no end-extension to a model of Tk + ¬ϕ(a). This is a
Σ12 assertion in the parameter a.
It is natural to inquire whether the parameter a of theorem 13 could be un-
countable in M . The answer is no. In general, neither (1 ⇒ 3) nor (2 ⇒ 3) holds
if a is uncountable in M . To see this, consider a = ωM1 . Then it is possible—in
either potentialist system—that a be made countable. However, no n ∈ M which
end-extends a can think that a is countable.
For the rest of this discussion, fix a very suitable theory T . We say that a
collection S of Σ1-sentences is a maximal Σ1-theory over T if T + S is consistent
and S is maximal among the sets of Σ1-sentences consistent with T . One can
easily construct a maximal Σ1-theory by enumerating the Σ1-sentences and adding
them one at a time, so long as the resulting theory is consistent with T . The same
argument shows that every collection of Σ1-sentences consistent with T is contained
in a maximal Σ1-theory.
An ω-standard model M of T , of course, can never have a maximal Σ1-theory,
because assertions like “the Σ1-definable universal finite sequence has length at
least n” are Σ1-sentences for standard n. For the same reason, the universal fi-
nite sequence in any model of T with a maximal Σ1 theory will necessarily have
nonstandard length.
Theorem 14. The following are equivalent for any very suitable theory T and any
countable M |= T .
(1) M satisfies the end-extensional maximality principle.
(2) M satisfies the ∆0-elementary-extensional maximality principle.
(3) The Σ1-theory of M is a maximal Σ1-theory over T .
Proof. (1⇔ 2) This holds becauseM satisfies ϕ in one potentialist system if and
only if it holds in the other, by theorem 14.
(1 ⇒ 3) Suppose ϕ is a Σ1-sentence consistent with the Σ1-theory of M . By
theorem 13 we get that ϕ holds at M . Because Σ1 assertions must be necessary,
ϕ holds at M , and so by the end-extensional maximality principle we get that
ϕ holds at M .
(3⇒ 1) Suppose that ϕ holds atM , so there is an end-extensionN |= T+ ϕ.
By theorem 13, there is a standard natural number k so that N thinks there is a
real x which is not contained in any ω-model of Tk + ¬ϕ. The assertion that there
is no model of Tk+¬ϕ containing x is Π
1
1 in the parameter x, and so its truth in N
is witnessed by the existence of a certain canonically-associated well-founded tree.
This is equivalent to a Σ1 assertion. Because the Σ1-theory of M is maximal we
therefore get that this is already true in M . So ϕ holds at M , and in particular
ϕ holds at M . 
Corollary 15. Every countable model of T has a ∆0-elementary extension—not
necessarily an end-extension—to a model satisfying the end-extensional maximality
principle, and therefore also the ∆0-elementary-extensional maximality principle.
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Proof. Let M be a countable model of T and let S0 be T plus the ∆0-elementary
diagram of M . Extend S0 to a maximal Σ1-theory S. Then S has a countable
model, which must be a ∆0-elementary extension of M . And by theorem 14 any
countable model of S must satisfy the two maximality principles. 
If M is ω-standard, then this extension cannot be an end-extension, as any
end-extension of M must also be ω-standard, and hence cannot have a maximal
Σ1-theory.
Question 16. Does every countable ω-nonstandard model of ZF end-extend to
a model satisfying the end-extensional maximality principle? By theorem 14 this
is equivalent to asking whether every countable ω-nonstandard model of ZF end-
extends to a model with a maximal Σ1-theory.
The corresponding question is also open for models of arithmetic, as discussed
in [Ham18b].
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